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Abstract. Analysis tools like abstract interpreters, symbolic execution tools and
testing tools usually require a proper context to give useful results when ana-
lyzing a particular function. Such a context initializes the function parameters
and global variables to comply with function requirements. However it may be
error-prone to write it by hand: the handwritten context might contain bugs or not
match the intended specification. A more robust approach is to specify the con-
text in a dedicated specification language, and hold the analysis tools to support
it properly. This may mean to put significant development efforts for enhancing
the tools, something that is often not feasible if ever possible.
This paper presents a way to systematically generate such a context from a formal
specification of a C function. This is applied to a subset of the ACSL specifica-
tion language in order to generate suitable contexts for the abstract interpretation-
based value analysis plug-ins of Frama-C, a framework for analysis of code writ-
ten in C. The idea here presented has been implemented in a new Frama-C plug-
in which is currently in use in an operational industrial setting.
Keywords: Formal Specification, Code Generation, Transformation, Code Anal-
ysis, Frama-C, ACSL
1 Introduction
Code analysis tools are nowadays effective enough to be able to provide suitable results
on real-world code. Nevertheless several of these tools including abstract interpreters,
symbolic execution tools, and testing tools must analyze the whole application from the
program entry point (the main function); or else either they just cannot be executed, or
they provide too imprecise results. Unfortunately such an entry point does not neces-
sarily exist, particularly when analyzing libraries.
In such a case, the verification engineer must manually write the context of the
analyzed function f as a main function which initializes the parameters of f as well
as the necessary global variables. This mandatory initialization step must enforce the
function requirements and may restrict the possible input values for the sake of memory
footprint and time efficiency of the analysis. This approach is however error-prone:
? This work was done when the first author was at CEA LIST, Software Reliability and Security
Laboratory.
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additionally to usual pitfalls of software development (e.g. bugs, code maintenance,
etc.), the handwritten context may not match the function requirements, or be over
restrictive. Moreover this kind of shortcomings may be difficult to detect due to the fact
that the context is not explicitly the verification objective.
A valid and more robust alternative is to specify such a context in a dedicated spec-
ification language, and make the analysis tools handle it properly. This is often an ar-
duous approach as the support for a particular specification language feature may entail
a significant development process, something that is often not feasible if ever possible.
Also, it requires to do so for every tool.
This paper presents a way to systematically generate an analysis context from a
formal specification of a C function. The function requirements as well as the addi-
tional restrictions over the input domains are expressed as function preconditions in the
ANSI/ISO C Specification Language (in short, ACSL) [2]. This specification S is in-
terpreted as a constraint system, simplified as much as possible, then converted into a
C code C which exactly implements the specification S. Indeed not only every possible
execution of C satisfies S but conversely, there is an execution of C for every possible
input satisfying the constraints expressed by S. We present the formalization of this
idea for an expressive subset of ACSL including standard logic operators, integer arith-
metic, arrays and pointers, pointer arithmetic, and built-in predicates for the validity
and initialization properties of memory location ranges.
We also provide implementation details about our tool, named CfP for Context from
Preconditions, implemented as a Frama-C plug-in. Frama-C is a code analysis frame-
work for code written inC [11]. Thanks to the aforementioned technique,CfP generates
suitable contexts for two abstract interpretation-based value analysis tools, namely the
the Frama-C plug-in EVA [3] and TIS-Analyzer [8] from the TrustInSoft company.
Both tools are actually distinct evolved versions of an older plug-in called Value [6]. In
particular, TrustInSoft successfully used CfP on the mbed-TLS library (also known as
PolarSSL), an open source implementation of SSL/TLS3, when building its verifica-
tion kit [21]. It is worth noting that CfP revealed some mistakes in contexts previously
written by hand by expert verification engineers when comparing its results with these
pieces of code. Also, CfP generates code as close as possible to human-written code: it
is quite readable and follows code patterns that experts of these tools manually write.
Contributions The contributions of this paper are threefold: a novel technique to sys-
tematically generate an analysis context from a formal specification of a C function,
a precise formalization of this technique, and a presentation of a tool implementing
this technique which is used in an operational industrial setting.
Outline Section 2 presents an overview of our technique through a motivating example.
Section 3 details preconditions to constraints conversion, while Section 4 explains the C
code generation scheme for these latter. Section 5 evaluates our approach and Section 6
discusses related work. Section 7 concludes this work by also discussing future work.
3 https://tls.mbed.org/
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2 Overview and Motivating Example
We illustrate our approach on context generation through the function aes crypt cbc,
a cryptographic utility implemented by the mbed-TLS library. Figure 1 shows its pro-
totype and ACSL preconditions as written by TrustInSoft for its verification kit [21].
1 typedef struct {
2 int nr; /* number of rounds */
3 unsigned long *rk; /* AES round keys */
4 unsigned long buf[68]; /* unaligned data */
5 } aes_context;
6
7 /*@ requires ctx_valid: \valid(ctx);
8 @ requires ctx_init: \initialized(ctx->buf + (0 .. 63));
9 @ requires ctx_rk: ctx->rk == ctx->buf;
10 @ requires ctx_nr: ctx->nr == 14;
11 @ requires mode: mode == 0 || mode == 1;
12 @ requires length: 16 <= length <= 16672;
13 @ requires length_mod: length % 16 == 0;
14 @ requires iv_valid: \valid(iv + (0 .. 15));
15 @ requires iv_init: \initialized(iv + (0 .. 15));
16 @ requires input_valid: \valid_read(input + (0 .. length - 1));
17 @ requires input_init: \initialized(input + (0 .. length - 1));
18 @ requires output_valid: \valid(output + (0 .. length - 1)); */
19 int aes_crypt_cbc(aes_context *ctx,int mode,size_t length,unsigned char iv[16],
20 const unsigned char *input,unsigned char *output);
Fig. 1: ACSL preconditions of the mbed-TLS function aes crypt cbc.
Specification The function aes crypt cbc provides encryption and decryption of
a buffer according to the AES cryptographic standard and the CBC encryption mode.
The function takes six parameters. The last two are the input and the output strings. The
parameter ctx stores the necessary information to the AES substitution-permutation
network, in particular the number of rounds and the round keys defined in a dedicated
structure at lines 1–5. The parameter mode indicates whether the function should en-
crypt or decrypt the input. The parameter length indicates the length of the input
string. Finally the parameter iv provides an initialization vector for the output of
16 characters (unsigned char iv[16]). This declared length is actually mean-
ingless for most C tools because an array typed parameter is adjusted to have a pointer
type [10, Section 6.9.1 and also footnote 79 at page 71], but CfP nevertheless considers
it as part of the specification in order to generate a more precise context.
ACSL annotations are enclosed in /*@ ... */ as a special kind of comments.
Therefore they are ignored by any C compiler. A function precondition is introduced
by the keyword requires right before the function declaration or definition. It must be
satisfied at every call site of the given function. Here the function aes crypt cbc has
12 precondition clauses, and the whole function precondition is the conjunction of all of
them. Clauses may be tagged with names, which are logically meaningless but provide a
way to easily refer to and to document specifications. For instance, the first precondition
(line 7) is named ctx valid while the second (line 8) is named ctx init.
We now detail the meaning of each precondition clause. All pointers must be valid,
that is properly allocated, and point to a memory block of appropriate length that
the program can safely access either in read-only mode (predicate \valid_read), or in
read-write mode (predicate \valid) . That is the purpose of preconditions ctx valid,
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iv valid, input valid and output valid: ctx must point to a memory block
containing at least a single aes context struct, iv must be able to contain at least 16
unsigned characters (ranging from 0 to 15), while input and output must be able to
contain at least length unsigned characters (ranging from 0 to length − 1). Mem-
ory locations, which are read by the function, must be properly initialized. That is the
purpose of the precondition clauses ctx init, iv init, and input init which
initialize the first 64 cells of ctx->buf as well as every valid cell of iv and input.
The specification clause mode specifies that the mode must be either 0 (encryption)
or 1 (decryption), while the specification clause length mod specifies that the length
should be a multiple of the block size (i.e. 16) as specified in mbed-TLS. The other
clauses restrict the perimeter of the analysis in order to make it tractable.
The clause ctx rk is a standard equality for an AES context, while the clause
ctx nr is true for 256-bit encryption keys. Finally the clause length aims to restrict
the analysis to buffers of size from 16 to 16672 unsigned characters.
Context Generation A naive approach for context generation would consider one pre-
condition clause after the other and directly implement it in C code. However, this
would not work, in general, since requirements cannot be treated in any order. In our
running example, for instance, variables input and output depends on the variable
length: the precondition clauses over this latter must be treated before those over
the former, as well as the generated code for these variables must initialize the lat-
ter, first, and the former afterwards, to be sound. To solve such problems, one could
first record every dependency among the left-values involved in the specification, and
then proceed to generate C code accordingly. An approach based only on a depen-
dency graph is nonetheless insufficient for those preconditions that need an inference
reasoning in order to be implemented correctly. As an example, treating the precondi-
tion /*@requires \valid(x+(0..3)) && *(x+4)==1;*/ demands to infer x as an array of 5
elements in order to consider the initialization x[4] = 1; correct.
We now give an overview on how we treat context generation by means of the
plug-in CfP of Frama-C. On the aes crypt cbc function contract, CfP provides
the result shown in Figure 2 (assuming that the size of unsigned long is 4 bytes4).
First note that every execution path ends by a call to the function aes crypt cbc.
Up to these calls, the code initializes the context variables (prefixed by cfp) in order
to satisfy the precondition of this function, while the different paths contribute to cover
all the cases of the specification. The initialization code is generated from sets of con-
straints that are first inferred for every left-value involved in the precondition. While
inferring these constraints from the precondition clauses, the implicit dependencies
among left-values are made explicit and recorded in a dependency graph. This latter
is finally visited to guide the code generation process in order to obtain correct C code.
Let us start detailing the generated code for both preconditions about length
(Figure 1, lines 12–13). First CfP declares a variable cfp length of the same type
as length (line 4). Then it initializes it by means of the Frama-C library function
Frama C unsigned int interval (line 7). It takes two unsigned int argu-
ments and returns a random value comprised between the two. This allows to fulfill
4 This kind of system-dependent information is customizable within Frama-C.
V1 int cfp_aes_crypt_cbc(void) {
2 unsigned char *cfp_output, *cfp_input;
3 unsigned char cfp_iv[16];
4 size_t cfp_length;
5 aes_context cfp_ctx;
6 int cfp_disjunction;
7 cfp_length = Frama_C_unsigned_int_interval(16, 16672);
8 if (cfp_length % 16 == 0) {
9 Frama_C_make_unknown((char *)cfp_ctx.buf,256);
10 cfp_ctx.nr = 14;
11 cfp_ctx.rk = cfp_ctx.buf;
12 Frama_C_make_unknown((char *)cfp_iv,16);
13 cfp_input = (unsigned char *)malloc(cfp_length);
14 if (cfp_input != (unsigned char *)0) {
15 Frama_C_make_unknown((char *)cfp_input, cfp_length);
16 cfp_output = (unsigned char *)malloc(cfp_length);
17 if (cfp_output != 0) {
18 cfp_disjunction = Frama_C_int_interval(0,1);
19 if (cfp_disjunction) {
20 int cfp_mode;
21 cfp_mode = 1;
22 aes_crypt_cbc(&cfp_ctx,cfp_mode,cfp_length,cfp_iv,cfp_input,cfp_output);
23 }
24 else {
25 int cfp_mode;
26 cfp_mode = 0;
27 aes_crypt_cbc(&cfp_ctx,cfp_mode,cfp_length,cfp_iv,cfp_input,cfp_output);
28 }
29 }
30 }
31 }
32 return 0;
33 }
Fig. 2: Slightly simplified version of the code generated by CfP for the specification in Figure 1.
Compared to the actual version, only a few integer casts have been removed for reasons of brevity.
the former requirement and to guarantee that Frama-C-based abstract interpreters will
interpret this result with exactly the required interval. Also, it corresponds to the way
that expert engineers would write a general context for such analyzers. Finally, the re-
quirement length % 16 == 0 is implemented by the conditional at line 8.
Lines 9–11 implement the preconditions about ctx, a pointer to an aes context.
Instead of allocating such a pointer, the generated code just declares a local variable
cfp ctx and passes its address to the function calls. This automatically satisfies the
precondition on pointer validity. Line 9 initializes the 256 first bytes of the structure field
buf by using the Frama-C library function Frama C make unknown. Assuming
that the size of unsigned long is 4 bytes, 256 bytes is the size of 64 values of type
unsigned long. Again, an expert engineer would also use this library function.
Lines 10 and 11 initialize the fields ctx->nr and ctx->rk by single assignments.
Here CfP fulfills the equality requirement ctx->rk == ctx->buf with respect to
ctx->rk instead of ctx->buf because the latter already refers to a memory buffer.
The requirements on function arguments iv, input, and output are imple-
mented by lines 12–17. Let us just point out how CfP defines the respective variables:
while ctx iv is as an array of 16 unsigned char, ctx input and ctx output
are just pointers to dynamically allocated memory buffers. Indeed, while CfP can infer
the exact dimension of the former from the specification, the dimension of these latter
depends on the value of ctx length, which is determined only at runtime.
VI
The last part of the generated code (lines 18–29) handles the requirement on mode,
which is either 0 or 1. Although the generated conditional may seem excessive in the
case of these particular values, it is nonetheless required in the general case (for in-
stance, consider the formula mode == 5 || mode == 7).
3 Simplifying ACSL Preconditions into State Constraints
This section presents a way to systematically reduce a function precondition to a set of
constraints on the function context (i.e. function parameters and global variables).
We first introduce an ACSL-inspired specification language on which we shall for-
malize our solution. Then, we define the notion of state constraint as a form of require-
ment over a C left-value, which in turn we generate as C code for initializing it. In
order to simplify state constraints the most, we make use of symbolic ranges, originally
introduced by Blume and Eigenmann [4] for compiler optimization. We finally provide
a system of inference rules that formalizes such a simplification process.
3.1 Core Specification Language
In this work we shall consider the specification language in Figure 3. It is almost a sub-
set of ACSL [2] but for the predicate defined, which subsumes the ACSL predicates
\initialized and \valid (see below).
Predicates P ::= T cop T term comparison (cop ∈ {≡,≤, <,≥, >})
| defined(M) M is defined
| P ∧ P | P ∨ P | ¬P logic formula
Terms T ::= z integer constant (z ∈ Z)
| M memory value
| T bop T arithmetic operation (bop ∈ {+,-,×,/,%})
Memory Values M ::= L left-value
| M ++ T single displacement
| M ++ T..T displacement range
Left-Values L ::= x C variable
| ?M dereference
Types κ ::= ι integer
| κ? pointer
Fig. 3: Predicates, terms, and types.
Predicates are logic formulæ defined on top of typed term comparisons and pred-
icates defined. Terms are arithmetic expressions combining integer constants and
memory values by means of the classic arithmetic operators. Memory values include
left-values, which are C variables and pointer dereferences (?), and memory displace-
ments through the operator (++). In particular,M ++ T1..T2 defines the set of memory
values {M ++ T1, . . . ,M ++ T2} and may only appear as the outermost construct in
a predicate defined. On integers, defined(L) holds whenever L is an initialized
left-value. On pointers, defined(M ) holds whenever M is a properly allocated and
initialized memory region.
VII
Term typing Terms of our language are typed. A left-value may take either an integer (ι)
or a pointer (κ?) type, while memory values are pointers. We omit the typing rules for
terms, which are quite standard. Let us just specify that memory values of the form
M ++ T have pointer type, as well as the recursive occurrence M , while T must have
integer type. (Memory values M ++ T..T are typed as set of pointers [2].) Since we
do not consider any kind of coercion construct, terms of pointer type cannot appear
where integer terms are expected, that is, they cannot appear in arithmetic expressions.
It also follows that term comparisons only relate terms of the same type.
Term normal forms For the sake of concision and simplicity, the remainder of this work
assumes some simplifications to take place on terms in order to consider term normal
forms only. In particular, arithmetic expressions are maximally flattened and factorized
(e.g. by means of constant folding techniques, etc.). We will conveniently write single
displacementsM ++ T asM ++ T..T . We also assume memory values with displace-
ment ranges to be either of the form x ++ T1..T2 or ?L ++ T1..T2. To this end, terms
of the form (L ++ T1..T2) ++ T3..T4 simplify into L ++ (T1 + T3)..(T2 + T4). Fi-
nally, memory values L ++ 0..0 normalize to L.
Disjunctive normal forms A precondition is a conjunction of predicate clauses, each
one given by an ACSL requires (cf. example in Figure 1). As a preliminary step, we
shall rewrite this conjunctive clause into its disjunctive normal form
∨
i
∧
j Pij , where
each Pij is a predicate literal (or simply literal), that is, a predicate without nested logic
formulæ. A negative literal is either of the form ¬defined(M) or ¬(M1 ≡M2), with
M1,M2 pointers, as every other negative literal in the input predicates is translated into
a positive literal by applying standard arithmetic and logical laws. A non-negative literal
is called a positive literal. Most of the rest of this section focuses on positive literals:
negative literals and conjunctive clauses are handled in the very end, while disjunctive
clauses will be considered when discussing code generation in Section 4.
3.2 State Constraints
We are interested in simplifying a predicate literal into a set of constraints over C left-
values, called state constraints. These are meant to indicate the minimal requirements
that the resulting C function context must implement for satisfying the function precon-
dition. In Section 4, they will be, in turn, converted into C code.
We intuitively consider a state constraint to represent the domain of definition of a
C left-value of the resulting function context state. Since such domains might not be
determined in terms of integer constants only, we shall found their definition on the
notion of symbolic ranges [4]. As we want to simplify state constraints the most, we
define them in terms of the symbolic range algebra proposed by Nazare´ et al. [14]. Our
definitions are nonetheless significantly different, even though inspired from their work.
Symbolic Expressions A symbolic expression E is defined by the following grammar,
where z ∈ Z, bop ∈ {+, -, ×, /, %}, and max and min are, respectively, the largest
and the smallest expression operators. We denote E the set of symbolic expressions.
E ::= z | x | ?E | E bop E | max(E,E) | min(E,E).
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In the rest of this section, we assume a mapping from memory values to their respec-
tive symbolic expression, and let the context discriminate the former from the latter.
In Section 3.3 we shall simplify symbolic expressions. For this, we need a domain
structure. Let us denote E∞ = E∪{−∞; +∞} and Z∞ = Z∪{−∞; +∞}. We define
a valuation of a symbolic expression E every map V(E), from E∞ to Z∞, obtained by
substituting every C variable in E with a distinct integer, the symbol ? with a natural
number strictly greater than 1 as a multiplicative coefficient, and interpreting the oper-
ators {bop,min,max} as their respective functions over Z∞ × Z∞. If we denote ≤∞
the standard ordering relation on Z∞, then the preorder 4 on E∞ is defined as follows:
E1 4 E2 ⇐⇒ ∀V,V(E1) ≤∞ V(E2).
The partial order  over E∞ is therefore the one induced from 4 by merging in the
same equivalence class elements x and y of E∞ such that x 4 y and y 4 x. As an
example, the elements 0 and min(0, 0) are equivalent.
Lattice of Symbolic Expression Ranges A symbolic range R is a pair of symbolic ex-
pressions E1 and E2, denoted [E1, E2]. Otherwise said, a symbolic range is an interval
with no guarantee that E1  E2. We denote R the set of symbolic ranges extended
with the empty range ∅ and v its partial ordering which is the usual partial order over
(possibly empty) ranges. Any symbolic range [E1, E2] such that E2 ≺ E1 is therefore
equivalent to ∅. Consequently (R,v) is a domain. Its infimum is ∅ while its supremum
is [−∞,+∞]. We denote unionsq and u its join and meet operators, respectively. It is worth
noting that, given (Ei)1≤i≤4 four symbolic expressions, the following equations hold:
[E1, E2] unionsq [E3, E4] = [min(E1, E3),max(E2, E4)]
[E1, E2] u [E3, E4] = [max(E1, E3),min(E2, E4)] .
In words, min and max are compliant with our ordering relations. In Section 3.3,
when simplifying literals, they will be introduced as soon as incomparable formulæ will
be associated to the same left-value, resulting into an unsimplifiable constraint. Also,
it is worth noting that unionsq and u are, in general, not statically computable operators. To
solve this practical issue, when these are not computable on some symbolic expres-
sions, CfP relies on the above equations in order to delay their evaluations at runtime.
Eventually, the code generator will convert them into conditionals.
State Constraints as Symbolic Ranges with Runtime Checks Symbolic ranges capture
most minimal requirements over the C left-values of a function precondition: for integer
typed left-values, a symbolic range represents the integer variation domain, while for
pointer typed left-values, it represents a region of valid offsets. They are commonly
used in abstract interpreters for range [7,13] and region analysis [14,18], respectively.
However, some predicate literals cannot be simplified into symbolic ranges, requir-
ing their encoding as runtime checks, that is, to be verified at runtime by means of
conditionals. We denote RTC(T1 cop T2) a runtime check between two terms T1 and
T2. We then call state constraint any pair C = R⊕X given by a symbolic range R and
a set X of runtime checks. We denote pi1(C) (resp. pi2(C)) the first (resp. the second)
projection of C, that is, R (resp. X).
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3.3 Inferring State Constraints
We now formalize our solution for simplifying a positive literal into a set of state con-
straints as a system of inference rules. Negative literals, as well as conjunctive clauses,
are handled separately at the end of the section.
Simplification Judgments Simplification rules are given over judgments of the form
Σ ` P ⇒ Σ′,
where P is a predicate literal, and Σ, Σ′ are maps from left-values to state constraints.
Each judgment associates a set of state constraints Σ and a literal P with the result of
simplifying P with respect to the left-values appearing in it, that is, an updated map Σ′
equal toΣ but for the state constraints on these latter. Figures 4 shows the formalization
of the main literal simplifications. This system does not assume the consistency of the
precondition: if this is inconsistent, no rule applies and the simplification process fails.
Predicates defined Figure 4a provides the simplification rules for literal defined.
Rules VARIABLE and DEREFERENCE enforce the initialization of a left-value L in
terms of the symbolic range neutral ival(κ). This latter is respectively defined as ∅,
for κ a pointer type, and [−∞,+∞], for κ integer type. These are quite common initial
approximations when inferring variation domains of either memory or integer values.
Rules RANGE-1 and RANGE-2 enforce the validity of a memory region determined
by the displacement range L ++ (T1..T2). The first premise of these rules established
whether L is already enforced inΣ to be an alias of a memory valueM , as indicated by
the singleton range [M ; M ]. If not, rule RANGE-1 first enforces the initialization of L
and the soundness of the displacement bound determined by T1 and T2, and then it up-
dates the region of valid offsets pointed to by L to include the range [0; T2]. In practice,
predicates 0 ≤ T1 ≤ T2 are added only if not statically provable. Moreover, note that we
do not consider T1 as the lower bound of the symbolic range, becauseCmemory regions
must start at index 0. Rule RANGE-2 handles the case of L alias ofM inΣ by enforcing
the validity of the memory region determined by M to take into account the displace-
ment range (T1..T2). In particular, since single displacements only may appear in
memory equality predicates (cf. rule MEMORY-EQ), M is of the form L′ ++ (T3..T3),
and the validity of the alias L within the range (T1..T2) is obtained by requiring the
validity of the displacement range L′ ++ (min(T1, T3)..max(T2, T3)).
Rule IDEMPOTENCE is provided only to allow the inference process to progress.
Term comparison predicates Rules in Figure 4b formalize the simplification of inte-
ger term comparison and memory equality predicates. The first two are actually rule
schema, as CMP-1 and CMP-2 describe term comparison simplifications over the in-
teger comparison operators {≡, ≤, ≥}. (Strict operators are treated in terms of non-
strict ones.) Let us detail rule CMP-1 with respect to a generic operator cop. The rule
applies whenever T1 cop T2 can be rewritten by means of classic integer arithmetic
transformations as L cop T3, that is, as a left-value in relation cop with an integer
term T3. If so, CMP-1 reduces the symbolic range of L with respect to the one given
by ival(cop, T3). This latter function takes a comparison operator cop and an integer
XIDEMPOTENCE
L ∈ Σ
Σ ` defined(L)⇒ Σ
VARIABLE
x 6∈ Σ type(x) = κ Σ′ = Σ ∪ {x 7→ neutral ival(κ)}
Σ ` defined(x)⇒ Σ′
DEREFERENCE
?M 6∈ Σ Σ ` defined(M)⇒ Σ′
type(?M) = κ Σ′′ = Σ′ ∪ {?M 7→ neutral ival(κ)}
Σ ` defined(?M)⇒ Σ′′
RANGE-1
pi1(Σ (L)) 6= [M ; M ]
Σ ` defined(L) ∧ 0 ≤ T1 ≤ T2 ⇒ Σ′ Σ′′ = Σ′
[
L← pi1(Σ′ (L)) unionsq [0; T2]
]
Σ ` defined(L ++ (T1..T2))⇒ Σ′′
RANGE-2
pi1(Σ (L)) = [M ; M ] base(M) = L
′ offset(M) = T3
Σ ` defined(L′ ++ (min(T1, T3)..max(T2, T3)))⇒ Σ′
Σ ` defined(L ++ (T1..T2))⇒ Σ′
(a) Simplification of literal defined.
CMP-1
L ∈ {T1, T2}
T1 cop T2  L cop T3 Σ ` defined(L) ∧
∧
L′∈T3
defined(L′)⇒ Σ′
Σ′′ = Σ′
[
L← pi1(Σ′ (L)) u ival(cop, T3)
]
Σ ` T1 cop T2 ⇒ Σ′′
CMP-2
Σ `
∧
L∈{T1,T2}
defined(L)⇒ Σ′
L ∈ {T1, T2} Σ′′ = Σ′
[
L← pi2(Σ′ (L)) ∪ RTC(T1 cop T2)
]
Σ ` T1 cop T2 ⇒ Σ′′
MEMORY-EQ
i, j ∈ {1, 2} ∧ i 6= j
base(M{i,j}) = L{i,j} offset(M{i,j}) = T{i,j} T3 = Tj + (−Ti)
M ′ = Lj ++ (T3..T3) Σ ` defined(Li) ∧ defined(M ′)⇒ Σ′
pi1(Σ
′ (Li)) v pi1(Σ′ (Lj)) Σ′′ = Σ′
[
Li ←
[
M ′; M ′
]]
Σ `M1 ≡M2 ⇒ Σ′′
(b) Simplification of term comparison and memory equality literals.
NOT-DEFINED
M 6∈ Σ
Σ ` ¬defined(M)⇒ Σ
MEMORY-NEQ
Σ ` defined(M1) ∧ defined(M2)⇒ Σ′ i, j ∈ {1, 2} ∧ i 6= j
base(M{i,j}) = L{i,j} [Li; Li] 6v pi1(Σ′ (Lj)) [Lj ; Lj ] 6v pi1(Σ′ (Li))
Σ `M1 6≡M2 ⇒ Σ′
(c) Simplification of negative literals.
Fig. 4: Simplification of literals into state constraints.
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term T as arguments, and returns as result the symbolic range [T ; T ] when cop is ≡,
[−∞; T ] (resp. [T ; +∞]) when cop is ≤ (resp. ≥). Since both L and T3 are integer
typed terms, there is no aliasing issue here. Rule CMP-2 can always be applied, although
we normally consider it when CMP-1 cannot. In that case, rule CMP-2 conservatively
enforces the validity of the term comparison by means of a runtime check.
Aliasing Rule MEMORY-EQ handles aliasing between two pointers with single dis-
placement M1 and M2. Assuming both of the form L{i,j} ++ T{i,j}, with distinct
i, j ∈ {1, 2}, a pointer M ′ is first defined as Lj with single displacement T3, this
latter determined by summing the offsets −Ti and Tj together. Such a pointer is then
enforced to be defined, and in the case that the actual region pointed by Lj is established
to be larger then the one pointed by Li, then Li is considered an alias of M ′. Although
rather conservative, due to the fact that v is not statically computable in general, the
second to last premise is important for ensuring soundness.
Negative literals Figure 4c shows the rules for negative literals. These rules do not
simplify literals into state constraints, but rather ensure precondition consistency. For
instance, ¬defined(x) ∧ x == 0 is inconsistent as x should be defined with value 0
and undefined at the same time. In such a case, the system must prevent code generation.
Rule NOT-DEFINED just checks that the memory value M does not appear in the
map Σ, which suffices to ensure that M is not yet defined.
Rule MEMORY-NEQ applies under the hypothesis that both pointers M1 and M2
determine different memory regions. In particular, the two are not aliases whenever
each base address of one pointer does not overlap with the memory region of the other.
Conjunctive Clauses
∧
i Pi, on either positive or negative literals Pi, are handled se-
quentially through the following AND rule. Given the definition of MEMORY-NEQ and
NOT-DEFINED, it assumes that negative literals are treated only after the positive ones,
by exhaustively applying rule MEMORY-NEQ first, and rule NOT-DEFINED afterwards.
AND
Σ0 ` P1 ⇒ Σ1 Σ1 ` P2 ⇒ Σ2 · · · Σn−1 ` Pn ⇒ Σn
Σ0 `
∧
i
Pi ⇒ Σn
Dependency Graph on Memory Values On a conjunctive clause, the system of infer-
ence rules in Figure 4 not only generates a map Σ, but it also computes a dependency
graph G on memory values. (Considering only the formalization of this section, the
memory values of the graph are actually left-values only. However, when considering
separately the ACSL predicates \initialized and \valid instead of defined, this is
not true anymore.) This graph is necessary for ensuring, first, the soundness of the rule
system with respect to mutual dependency on left-values in Σ, and, consequently, for
the correct ordering of left-value initializations when generating C code (cf. Section 4).
Generally speaking, each time a rule that needs inference is used in a state constraint
derivation for some left-value L (e.g. DEREFERENCE, RANGE-1, CMP-1, etc.), edges
from L to every other left-value involved in some premise are added to the dependency
graph G. Such derivation fails as soon as this latter operation makes the graph G cyclic.
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Example When applying the inference system on our example in Figure 1, the final
map associates the integer length to [16, 16672] ⊕ {RTC(length%16 ≡ 0)} and
the array input to [0,length− 1]⊕∅, along with the dependency graph in Figure 5.
ctx->rk
*ctx
ctx->nr ctx->buf
iv + (0 .. 15)
*(iv + (0 .. 15))
ctx->buf[0 .. 63]
ctx mode length
input + (0 .. length - 1) output + (0 .. length - 1)
iv input output
*(input + (0 .. length - 1))
Fig. 5: Dependency graph for the aes crypt cbc preconditions generated by CfP.
The system of inference rule in Figure 4 is sound: given a conjunctive clause P , the
simplification procedure on P always terminates, either with Σ or it fails. In the former
case, for each left-value L in P , state constraints in Σ satisfy respective literals in P
(that we denote as Σ |= P ).
Theorem 1. For all conjunctive clause P , either ∅ ` P ⇒ Σ and Σ |= P , or it fails.
4 Generating C Code from State Constraints
This section presents the general scheme for implementing preconditions, through state
constraints, in a C language enriched with one primitive function for handling ranges.
In practice, such primitive is meant to be analyzer-specific so as to characterize state
constraints as precisely as possible. As an example, we report on the case of our tool
CfP. However, for the sake of conciseness, we do neither detail nor formalize the code
generation scheme. We nevertheless believe that the provided explanation should be
enough to both understand and implement such a system in a similar setting.
Generating Code from a Conjunctive Clause Consider a conjunctive clause C and the
pair (Σ, G), respectively given by the map of state constraints and the dependency
graph of C, inferred by the system of rules in Figure 4. We shall show the general case
of disjunctive normal forms
∨n
i=1 Ci later on.
To generate semantically correct C code, we topologically iterate over the left-
values of G so as to follow the dependency ordering. For every visited left-value L,
we consider its associated state constraint C = R⊕X in Σ. Then, the symbolic range
R is handled by generating statements that initialize L. For most constructs, these state-
ments are actually a single assignment, although a loop over an assignment may be
sometimes needed (e.g. when initializing a range of array cells). In particular, initial-
izations of left-values L to symbolic ranges [T1, T2] are implemented by means of the
primitive function make range(κ, T1, T2), where κ is integer or pointer type. In prac-
tice, this function must be provided by the analyzer for which the context is generated,
so that, when executed symbolically, the analyzer’s abstract state will associate abstract
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values [T1, T2] to respective left-values L. Finally, conditionals are generated to initial-
ize left-values with symbolic expressions involving min and max.
OnceL has been initialized, the rest of the code is guarded by conditionals generated
from runtime checks in X . To resume, the generation scheme for L is the following:
1 /* initialization of L from R through assignments */
2 if (/* runtime checks from X */) {
3 /* code for initializing the next left-values */ ...; } }
After the initialization of the last left-value, the function under consideration (in our
running example, the function aes crypt cbc) is called with the required arguments.
Handling Disjunctions We rewrite preconditions into disjunctive normal form
∨n
i=1 Ci
as a preliminary step. Then we process each disjunct Ci independently by applying the
inference system in Figure 4 and the code generation scheme previously described.
We now describe the code generation scheme of such a precondition
∨n
i=1 Ci given
the code fragments for each and every of its disjunct Ci. If n = 1, then the code fragment
of C1 is directly generated. Otherwise, an additional variable cfp disjunction is
generated and initialized to the interval [1, n]. Then, a switch construct (or a condi-
tional if n = 2) is generated, where each case contains the fragmentBi respective to Ci.
To resume, the context is generated as a function including the following code pattern:
1 cfp_disjunction = make_range(ι, 1, n);
2 switch (cfp_disjunction) {
3 case 1: { B_1; break; }
4 case 2: { B_2; break; }
5 ...
6 case n: { B_n; break; }
7 }
Primitives in CfP Our tool CfP follows the generation scheme just described. It im-
plements make range in terms of the Frama-C built-ins Frama C τ interval,
with τ a C integral type, and Frama C make unknown to handle symbolic ranges
for integers and pointers, respectively. These built-ins are properly supported by the
two abstract interpretation-based value analysis tools EVA [3] and TIS-Analyzer [8].
5 Implementation and Evaluation
We have implemented our context generation mechanism as a Frama-C plug-in, called
CfP for Context from Preconditions, written in approximately 3500 lines of OCaml.
(Although Frama-C is open source, CfP is not, due to current contractual obligations.)
CfP has been successfully used by the company TrustInSoft for its verification kit [21]
of the mbed-TLS library, an open source implementation of the SSL/TLS protocol.
We now evaluate our approach, and in particular CfP, in terms of some quite natural
properties, that is, usefulness, efficiency, and quality of the generated contexts.
This work provides a first formal answer to a practical and recurring problem when
analyzing single functions. Indeed, the ACSL subset considered is expressive enough
for most real-world C programs. Most importantly, CfP enables any tool to support a
compelling fragment of ACSL at the minor expense of implementing two Frama-C
built-ins, particularly so if compared to the implementation of a native support (if ever
possible). Finally, CfP has proved useful in an operational industrial setting in revealing
some mistakes in contexts previously written by hand by expert verification engineers.
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Although we cannot disclose precise data about these latter, CfP revealed, most notably,
overlooked cases in disjunctions and led to fix incomplete specifications.
CfP is able to efficiently handle rather complex ACSL preconditions: the generation
of real-world contexts (e.g. the one of Figure 2) is usually instantaneous. Although
the disjunctive normal form can be exponentially larger than the original precondition
formula, such transformation is used in practice [17,12] and leads to better code in
terms of readability and tractability by the verification tools. This approach is further
justified by the fact that, in practice, just a small number of disjuncts are typically used
in manually-written ACSL specifications.
Our approach allows to generate contexts which are reasonably readable and fol-
lows code patterns that experts of the Frama-C framework use to manually write. In
particular, when handling disjunctions, CfP factorizes the generated code for a particu-
lar left-value as soon as the rule system infers the very same solution in each conjunc-
tive clause. For instance, in our running example, only the initialization of the variable
mode depends on the disjunction mode == 0 || mode == 1. Hence all the other
left-values are initialized before considering cfp disjunction (cf. Figure 2).
We conclude by briefly discussing some current limitations. Our ACSL fragment
considers quantifier free predicate formulæ, and no coercion constructs are allowed.
Support for casts among integer left-values should be easy to add, whereas treating
memory addresses as integers is notoriously difficult. We leave these for future work.
6 Related Work
Similarly to our approach, program synthesis [12,20,16] automatically provides pro-
gram fragments from formal specifications. However, the two approaches have differ-
ent purposes. Once executed either symbolically or concretely, a synthesized program
provides one computational state that satisfies the specification, while a context must
characterize all such states. In particular, not only every state must satisfy the specifi-
cation but, conversely, this set of states must contain every such possible one.
In software testing, contexts are useful for concentrating the testing effort on partic-
ular inputs. Most test input generation tools, like CUTE [19] and PathCrawler [5,9],
allow to express contexts as functions which, however, the user must manually write.
Some others, like Pex [1], directly compile formal preconditions for runtime checking.
The tool STADY [15] shares some elements of our approach. It instruments C func-
tions with additional code for ensuring pre- and postconditions compliance, allowing
monitoring and test generation. However, the tool performs a simple ACSL-to-C trans-
lation, it does neither take into account dependencies among C left-values, nor it infer-
ences their domain of definition.
7 Conclusion
This paper has presented a novel technique to automatically generate an analysis context
from a formal precondition of a C function. The core of the system has been formalized,
while we provide enough details about code generation to allow similar systems to
be implemented. Future work includes the formalization of code generation as well as
statements and proofs of the fundamental properties of the system as a whole. A running
example from the real world has also illustrated our presentation. The whole system is
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implemented in the Frama-C plug-in CfP. It generates code as close as possible to
human-written code. It is used in an operational industrial setting and already revealed
some mistakes in contexts previously written by hand by expert verification engineers.
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